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an inventory be taken once a year, the contract was not breached
because the assured permitted sixteen months to elapse before
taking an inventory.'
As in the case of representations, Section 4o2-m'has like-
wise changed the rule pertaining to warranties and it is now
necessary, in order to avoid the policy, to show that the warranty
was not only false but that it was made with intent to deceive.
On account of legislative enactments herein pointed out, it
is perceived that there is a wide distinction in the law of con-
cealments and representations as applied to fire insurance policies
and the other branches of insurance, but the law applicable to
warranties, as provided by Section 42o2-m, seems to apply with
equal force to all branches of insurance.
17. Newton vs. Theresa Village Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 Wis. 289, l04
N. W. io7.
TAX TITLES UPON WHICH THE THREE-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
HAS RUN
By K. K. KI NNAN, OF TH4 MiLWAUKEE BAR.
EnIToR's NoTE: -This is the second of two articles on tax titles by
Mr. Kennan. The first, dealing with TAX TITLES UPON WHICH THE
THREE-YEAR STATUTE HAS NOT RUN, appeared in the April
number of the Review.
Having examined some of the technical defects which can be
utilized to set aside a tax deed before the three-years' statute has
run in its favor, we shall now consider some of the points which
can be raised to set aside a tax deed after the statute has run, or
appears to have run, in its favor.
The three-years' statute of limitations, as against the former
owner, will be found in Section x i88 of the Revised Statutes, and
reads as follows:
"No action shall be maintained by the former owner or any
person claiming under him to recover the possession of any land
or any interest therein which shall have been conveyed by deed
for the non-payment of taxes or to avoid such deed against any
person claiming under such deed unless such action shall be
brought within three years next after the recording of such deed.
Whenever any such action shall be commenced upon a tax deed
heretofore or hereafter issued after the expiration of three years
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from the date of the recording of such deed, unless such action
shall be brought by a person who was a minor at the time the
right of action shall accrue as aforesaid, such deed, if executed
substantially in the form prescribed by law for the execution of
tax deeds, shall be conclusive evidence of the existence and
legality of all proceedings from and including the assessment of
the property for taxation up to and including the execution of
such deed."
The effective operation of this statute has been so uniformly
sustained and its functions so clearly defined, through a long line
of decisions of our Supreme Court, that it stands as a sort of
corner stone upon which most of our valid tax titles rest. But it
must not be thought that, because a tax deed has been recorded
three years, it is therefore necessarily invulnerable to attack.
There are quite a number of methods by which a tax deed may
often be drawn forth from the protecting aegis of the three-years'
statute and successfully assailed. If an opinion is asked as to the
validity of a tax deed which has been recorded three years, it is
well not to be in haste to declare it valid until the following
contingencies have been carefully investigated and considered:
First: The tax for the non-payment of which the land was
sold may have been paid or redeemed. It happens quite fre-
quently that the town, village or city treasurer, in making out the
tax receipts, or in noting the payments upon the tax roll, makes
an error by which a description upon which the tax has been paid,
is returned delinquent and sold. If the error is in the tax receipt,
the party paying the taxes should notice it and have the receipt
corrected. One who pays the taxes upon another man's land can-
not recover the money. If a person sends a list of lands to the
town treasurer and with the list the amount of money necessary
to pay the taxes, and he sends back a receipt for other lands, it
is such person's duty to call his attention to the error in his
receipt and have it corrected; but it often happens that the receipt
is correct, but the stub of the receipt is wrong, or the payment
of the tax is entered against the wrong description on the tax
roll, leaving the correct description to be returned as delinquent.
In such a case, the receipt governs and the tax deed is absolutely
void and the defect is not cured by the statute of limitation. The
party holding the tax receipt can exhibit it to the county clerk, who
will make a notation on the sales book of the date and number
of the tax receipt and the county board will then order the deed
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canceled. The tax deed holder can usually recover the money
which he paid for the tax certificates and for tax deed fees and
recording, with interest at seven per cent under Section 1184,
Revised Statutes, if application is made for such refund within
six years.
In order to investigate the question of whether the tax has.
been paid or not it is well to look at the stub of the tax or redemp-
tion receipt and at the entry of the payment of the tax in the tax
roll or in the salesbook, if it was redeemed. It must also be
remembered that there is such a thing ag constructive payment of
the tax, resulting from a bona fide attempt to pay the tax which
is frustrated through some fault of the public official. The rule
governing such cases has -been enunciated by the Supreme Court
as follows: "If a person offers to pay to the proper official the
tax assessed upon a particular description of land for a particular
year, or to redeem the land from a tax sale for such tax, and the
officer informs him that there is no tax to be paid or tax sale to
redeem from, and he, in good faith, relies thereon, a tax deed
based on the tax which he endeavored to so pay, thereafter
executed, will not pass title to the land to the grantee therein.'"
Nelson vs. Churchill, 117 Wis., 10. If a person, while owner of
the land, should own the tax .certificates even for an instant of
time this would work a redemption of the certificates, and no,
valid deeds could be issued upon them. Bennett vs. Keehn, 57
Wis., 582.
Second: There may be minors who are entitled to redeem.
Under Section 1166, Revised Statutes, the lands of minors or-
any interest they may have in lands sold for taxes may be
redeemed at any time before such minors come of age and dur-
ing one year thereafter. The lands of idiots and insane persons
so sold, or any interest they may have therein, may be redeemed
at any time during the disability and during one year thereafter.
It has even been held that equitable interests or interests resting
solely upon moral obligation are sufficient to justify redemption
on the part of a minor. In a very early case it was held that if
a statute began, to run before the death of the ancestor it would
continue to run until its completed period, although the title, in
the meantime, should pass from the adult owner to the minor..
Swearingen vs. Robertson, 39 Wis., 462.
While the purposes of this law are unquestionably laudable,
advantage has been taken of its provisions in ways which were-
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evidently not intended by those who framed it. For example, the
writer knows of a millionaire landowner who deeded a large
amount of his least valuable lands and city lots to his youngest
son, who was only a few years old, intending, that if the land
should become more valuable before this boy reached the age of
twenty-two years, he would redeem them in his son's name and,
if not, would let them go. In another case a large manufacturing
company, which owns a great many thousand acres of cutover
lands, deeded all these lands to one of its officers in trust for the
daughter of that officer, who was a young child. The company
continues to handle the land as before, paying taxes upon the
more valuable portions and selling whenever opportunity offers.
They reserve the right to redeem on behalf of the minor when-
ever the lands which they had supposed were worthless turn out
to have some value. There is {;ome doubt whether the courts
would sustain the right of the trustee to redeem on behalf of the
minor under such circumstances.
As an illustration of the tricks which may be played under this
law, let us suppose that a person takes and records a perfectly
valid tax deed upon a piece of land. The deed is correct in form,
is properly recorded and indexed, and the land is unoccupied.
Upon consulting the records he finds that the land is owned by an
adult person, and, believing his title good, after the statute has
run in its favor, he conveys the land by warranty deed to other
parties who, perhaps, make valuable improvements. For twenty
years the taxes on the land are paid by those holding under the
tax deed; then, a deed is put on record, which shows that some
twenty years before, the former owner conveyed the land to his
infant child. The minor redeems the tax certificate upon which
the tax deed was issued, and claims the land. He is not required
to pay the taxes which the tax-deed holder and his grantees have
paid for twenty years, nor even the cost of the tax deed; and, if
he regains possession of the property without maintaining eject-
ment, it is doubtful whether he can be required to pay for the
improvements.
It is the possibility of some such contingency as this, which
makes one hesitate to say that any tax deed conveys a perfect
title.'
Third: The constructive possession of the tax-title claimant
i. Nor: - Upon this point see the late cases of Corry vs. Shea, 144
Wis., 135; and Brooks vs. Dyke, 156 Wis., 152.-K. K. K.
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may have been interrupted by acts of possession on the part of
the original owner, in which case the statute would run against
the tax deed instead of in its favor. In such a case the tax-title
claimant could preserve his rights by bringing a suit to bar the
original owner before the expiration of the three years, but he
would run the risk of having his tax title.defeated by any of the
technical defects which would otherwise be cured by the statute.
As to the degree of possession required to constitute such an
interruption our decisions are not very definite. It has been held,
on the one hand, that mere fugitive, occasional acts of occupancy,
such as pasturing cattle upon the land or cutting a small amount
of timber, or paying taxes upon it, would not suffice to break the
bar of the statute. On the other hand, the building of fences, or
the cutting of pine timber, have been held sufficient. To use the
words of the Court: "If the plaintiffs actually and exclusively
occupied the land in question in hostility to the defendant's title
and subjected the same to their will and dominion by actual and
appropriate use thereof, according to its locality, quality and
character, the evidence of such occupancy being tangible and
visible to a person going upon and examining the land, such occu-
pancy and use constitute adverse possession." Finn et al vs. Wis,
consin River Land Co., 72 Wis., 546.
Fourth: There may be jurisdictional defects, as, for example,
that the land was not taxable at the time the assessment was
made, Whitney vs. Gunderson, 31 Wis., 359; or was taxed in the
wrong town, Smith vs. Sherry, 54 Wis., 114. Or that it included
in part land which was exempt from taxation; C. St. P. M. & 0.
Ry. Co. vs. Bayfield County, 87 Wis., 188.
In the northern portion of this state very many tax certifi-
cates and tax deeds have been set aside upon the ground that the
right-of-way of the railroad had not been excepted in the various
taxing proceedings. The question has never come squarely before
the Supreme Court and there is some doubt as to how they will
hold in regard to it. Of course, a tax deed cannot be taken which
will actually cover the right-of-way, track and roadbed, in such a
way that the tax title owner could take possession of it and tear
up the track, thus interfering with the public use; but in those
cases where the railroad owns merely the easement over the land
it might be urged with much force that this was a public,
notorious, visible easement, like an ordinary highway, and that
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the taxing proceedings would be presumed to have affected only
the right in the soil subject to the easement.2
Fifth: There may have been an element of fraud in the tak-
ing of the tax deed which the statute would not cure, as, for
example, when a person who bears such a fiduciary relation to
the owner that it would be improper for him to take a tax deed,
has attempted to do so. In a case where an agent for minors
allowed their land to go for taxes and took a tax deed to himself,
the whole transaction was held to be void, or more correctly
speaking, the tax deed was held to have been taken for the benefit
of the minors. Pulford et al vs. Whicker et al, 76 Wis., 555. In
another case where negotiations for settlement were in progress
between the original owner and the tax-title claimant, by reason
of which the tax-title claimant was deterred from bringing suit
within the three years, the Court held that the negotiations for
settlement interrupted and suspended the constructive possession
of the claimant. Cornell Univ. vs. Mead, 8o Wis., 387.
A mortgagor cannot take a tax deed on the mortgaged
premises which will cut off the mortgage. Newton vs. Marshall,
62 Wis., 8. Neither can a mortgage cut off the equity of redemp-
tion of the mortgagor by means of a tax deed. Burchard et al vs.
Roberts, 7o Wis., iii. By Section 1143, Revised Statutes, it is
made unlawful for a county clerk or county treasurer, or any of
their clerks or deputies, or any person for them to purchase tax
certificates, and deeds upon certificates purchased in contravention
of this law would not be protected by the statute.
Sixth: The tax deed may not have been properly recorded
and indexed. In this case the statute would not run in its favor
and the taxes could be redeemed at any time. Our Supreme
Court has held, not only that a tax deed should be recorded, but
also that the recording is not complete until the deed has been
properly indexed. As to the requirements for correct indexing
as set forth in Section 759 of the Revised Statutes, the reader is
perhaps aware that it is not necessary to index under the head
of State of Wisconsin, and that the words "see record" are sufil-
cient under the head of description; but the writer has seen
indexes in this State which do not comply with the law as to the
2. NoTE: -But, as to special assessments, see C. M. & St. P. Ry. vs.
Janesville, 137 Wis., 7.
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headings and would no doubt be held insufficient by the Court.
The law requires that the index should show.
Number of Instruments,
Time of Reception,
Name of Grantor,
Name of Grantee,
Description of Land,
Name of Instrument,
Volume and page where recorded,
To whom delivered,
Fees received.
It is probable that an error or omission in the first or either
of the last two of these headings would not be considered fatal;
but if the instrument were described as a quit-claim deed when
it was a tax deed or the wrong volume and page were given, or
there was an error in the description, these defects would no
doubt invalidate the record.
A curious question arises in the case of transcripts from
other counties which are necessarily indexed separately and fre-
quently in a separate volume. It remains to be seen whether the
courts will consider such an indexing sufficient. In the matter
of recording deeds, our Supreme Court has recently shown a dis-
position to be quite lenient and only requires that the record
should be a substantial copy and "so near a literal copy of the
same as to point out to a person of ordinary intelligence, upon a
reasonably careful inspection, the subject matter and substance
thereof." Laughlin vs. Kieper, 125 Wis., 161.
This was held in a case where the variations between the
original deed and the record thereof were quite numerous and, in
the writer's opinion, this decision marks a step in the wrong
direction. It is not too much to require of every register of deeds
that all instruments should be recorded accurately, and if any-
thing less than an accurate transcript is to be admitted as a
record, we are sure to have difficulty in drawing the line between
what can be omitted with impunity and what cannot.
Seventh: The tax deed may be cut off by a tax deed on a
later sale to a different grantee. This, of course, is not properly
a defect in the tax deed, but a contingency which might operate
to defeat any title and it is alluded to solely for the purpose of
calling attention to two points. First. One who holds several
successive tax deeds. may plead and rely upon all or any of them
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and is not required to elect which one he will rest his title upon.
Second. The tax deed upon the later sale (called the junior
tax deed) will cut off a tax deed based upon a previous sale,
even though the deed upon the earlier sale was taken after the
.other. As much confusion 'has arisen on this point, it may be
well to give a concrete instance. Supposing that X had taken a
tax deed last June on a certificate of sale of 1905, and at a later
date - say in September - Y took a tax deed on the same prop-
erty on sale of 19o4. X's deed, if valid, would cut Y's off, and no
statute of limitation would help Y's deed unless aided by actual
possession. In a recent case a somewhat curious argument was
advanced. It was claimed that when a series of tax deeds were
taken upon successive sales, each new deed would interrupt and
terminate the constructive possession under the preceding one, so
that the statute of limitations would fail to run its full period
upon any of the deeds, except the last one. But our Supreme
Court has disposed of this contention in a good-humored way, as
follows: "No particular reason is perceived why one tax-title
claimant may not be in constructive possession as to the original
owner, and a subsequent tax-title claimant may not also .be in
constructive possession as to both the original owner and the
prior claimant at the same time. The shadowy possessions will
,certainly not crowd each other. The whole force of the defend-
ant's argument depends on the proposition that there can be but
one constructive possession at the same time, and hence that
when the second tax deed was recorded the ghostly, shade which
represented the plaintiff must necessarily have glided noiselessly
from one side of the land, while the equally diaphanous shade of
the defendant glided in upon the other side." Cezikolski vas. Fry-
drychowics, 120 Wis., 369.
Eighth. Another contingency which may arise hereafter to
defeat a tax deed upon which the three-year statute has run is
that made possible by Chapter 6o7, Laws of I9o7,3 which pro-
vides that when the original owner, or any one claiming under
him, shall pay all the taxes assessed against the lands continuously
for five years next after the execution of such tax deed "without
actual notice of the existence of such tax deed" said tax deed
shall be void. As will readily be seen, the effect of this section
could be nullified by notifying the owner of the land, after the
three-years' statute had run, that a tax deed was outstanding.
3. Sec. 1187, Revised Statutes.
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No cases are likely to arise calling for a construction of this
act until five years after the publication of the act (which was
July 15, 1907), as it does not seem to be retroactive.
Ninth: The tax deed may be void upon its face. A few sug-
gestions as to the more common mistakes which render tax deeds
void upon their face may not be out of place at this time. Per-
haps the most common is the failure to show positively that the
person to whom the deed is issued is either the purchaser at the
sale or the assignee of such purchaser. In any case the name of
the purchaser must be given. Krueger vs. Knab, 22 Wis., 4o9;
North vs. Wendell, 22 Wis., 411; Eaton vs. Lyman, 33 Wis., 34;
Hunt vs. Stinson, 10I Wis., 556.
Referring to the tax deed itself, it must appear that the per-
son named in the deed as grantee is either the person designated
therein as purchaser at the tax sale, or else that he was the
assignee of such person. It has been held that where the pur-
chasers were named as a certain county and an individual, this
rendered the deed void as showing a joint purchase; Sprague vs.
Coenen, et al, 30 Wis., lO9. But where the deed recited that the
sale was to Douglas County and to F. H. Ruger, respectively,
this did not indicate a joint purchase and the deed was sustained.
Hunt vs. Stinson, 10I Wis., 556.
Judge Marshall, in reviewing the various decisions mentioned
in that case, said: "They have stopped short of holding that the
deed must specify as to each description who was the purchaser
at the tax sale, or that when there have been several assignees
the facts in that regard shall appear; or that, if some of the lands
were sold to one person and some to another, and that appear,
with the names of the purchasers, but without showing the pur-
chaser as to each tract, that is not substantial compliance with
the requirements of the statute. * * * The purpose of the require-
ment that the name of the purchaser shall appear, is that the deed
shall show a legal sale as regards a vendee competent to purchase,
and the requirement that the tax deed shall run to an assignee of
the certificate is for the purpose of showing that the tax deed
issued to a person entitled to receive it."
In some counties in Wisconsin, the county clerks have
attempted to improve upon the form of tax deed given in the
statute by inserting an additional clause, as follows:
"And whereas it appears, as the fact is, that the aforesaid
certificates have been duly assigned by the said ...............
to said .....................
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This clause is entirely unnecessary and occasionally makes
trouble, as it did in the case of Dunbar vs. Lindsay, in which case
the name of the purchaser, William Lindsay, was written in the
second line of the deed and also in the fourteenth, and thus far
the deed was entirely correct; but, in the additional clause to
which I have referred, the name was also filled in so that it was
made to appear that the certificate had been assigned to the said
William Lindsay. The Court held the deed void upon the ground
that its recitals were contradictory. Dunbar vs. Lindsay, 119
Wis., 239.
In another case where the second line read, "Whereas, A. C.
Probert, assignee of Bayfield County," etc., and the fourteenth
line gave the same name as that of the purchaser, the Court held,
that as the recitals were contradictory, the tax deed was void
upon its face, said A. C. Probert, being spoken of both as assignee
and purchaser. Washburn Land Co. vs. C. St. C. & 0. R. Co.,
124 Wis., 305.
In a recent case the party taking the tax deed varied the form
of it by making the second line read, "Whereas, Jennie A. White,
assignee of the several tax certificates as stated below, and then
inserting opposite the amount for which each description was
sold, a separate column headed "Buyer of certificates at tax sale,"
writing out the names of the various buyers in that column. The
fourteenth line set forth that the sale was made "to the said
several purchasers." The Court held this deed sufficient. Doolittle
vs. J. L. Gates Land Co., 131 Wis., 24.
A second defect, which may render a tax deed void on its
face, is any error or indefiniteness in the description. The follow-
ing are instances of descriptions which have been held indefinite:
North and west part N. B. Y Sec. 4, T. 4, R. 12.
Part of N. W. 4, Lot 3, B. by Wolcott, R. by Scharb, S. by
Worthy, W. by Webber, 5.25 acres of Sec. 9, T. 7, R. 22, Lot 3
and the N. R. Y of the N. W. Y less seven acres of Sec. 5, etc.
Third: If the time or place of sale is erroneously stated this
would be a fatal defect, as, for example, if the day of sale should
appear to have been a legal holiday, or a day prior to the time
authorized by law. As the sale may continue from day to day, a
date later than the third Tuesday of May' is not necessarily
illegal.
4. NoTE: - Now changed to second Tuesday in June.-K. K. K.
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In Wood vs. Meyer, 36 Wis., 3o8, the Court held that a tax:
deed would not be held void on the ground that the tax sale was.
made at a time not authorized by law unless the Court should
find that the day of sale mentioned, was ex necessitat legis one
on which the sale could not have properly taken place.
The writer some time ago attempted to set aside a tax deed
which conveyed several descriptions and which set forth that the
sale took place upon the I8th, 2oth and 2lst days of May, the
argument being that it was impossible to tell the date of sale as
to any one of the descriptions and that, therefore, the date was
not given. The Court did not, however, have occasion to decide
the question. In a case where the place of sale was given as
Green Bay when it should have been Ft. Howard, the deed was
held void. Lander vs. Bromley et al, 79 Wis., 372.
Section 1130 of the Revised Statutes seems to require that the-
sale should be conducted at a public place, at the seat of justice
of the county, but our court has held that a statement that the
land was sold at the county treasurer's office in Bayfield County
was sufficient.
Fourth: If the deed shows upon its face that it was issued
before the expiration of three full years from the date of sale, it
is clearly void upon its face. For example, if the sale took place
May 20, 1902, and the deed was issued May 20, 1905, it would be
void, as the owner or occupant under Section 1165 has the right
to redeem "at any time within three years from the date of the
certificate of sale." Whittlesey vs. Hoppenyan, 72 Wis., 140;
Safford vs. Conan, 88 Wis., 354; Gates vs. Parmly, et al, 93
Wis., 294.
The issuance of the tax deed one day too soon is quite a com-
mon error and one which is easily overlooked.
It has been held that where the tax deed was not dated at all,
but the acknowledgment was dated, the deed was not neces-
sarily void for that reason, as it took effect from delivery and the
statute of limitations began to run from the date of the indexing
and recording. McMichael vs. Carlyle, 53 Wis. 504.
Fifth: The deed may have been issued upon outlawed cer-
tificates. Section 1182 of the Statutes expressly provides that no
tax deed shall issue on a tax certificate after the expiration of
six years from date of the sale or assignment. If the tax deed
shows on its face that it was issued more than six years from
TAX TITLES
the date of the purchase of the certificate, this would render it
void.
The statute further expressly provides that no tax deed shall
be issued on any tax certificate after fifteen years from the day
of sale. The date of assignment does not usually appear on the
tax deed, but can be ascertained by looking up the tax certificate
which will be attached to the affidavit of non-occupancy or the
notice of taking tax deed. The county clerk probably has no juris-
diction to issue a tax deed on an outlawed certificate.
Sixth: In several early cases it was held that the omission of
the words "as the fact is" would render the deed void upon its
face. Lain vs. Cook, 15 Wis., 446; Wakely vs. Mohr, 18 Wis.,
336; Cutler vs. Hurlbut, 29 Wis., 152; St. Croix Land & Timber
Co. vs. Ritchie, 73 Wis., 409.
Seventh: The omission of the State of Wisconsin as one of
the grantors, has repeatedly been held sufficient to render the deed
void on its face, and if the State were givefl as one of the gran-
tors, and the county omitted, the result would be the same. This
omission is quite frequently found in deeds which are not drawn
on regular forms, but are written out with a pen. Woodman vs.
Clapp, 21 Wis., 355; Lindsay vs. Fay, 25 Wis., 460; Eastley vs.
Whipple, 51 Wis., 485.
Eighth: The absence of the county seal will render the deed
void on its face, though the Court has recently shown a disposi-
tion to give great force to the recital in the testimonium clause to
the effect that the deed was sealed. The seal can be in any form
which has been adopted by the county board as the county seal,
and it does not seem to be held necessary that the record of the
deed should contain an exact copy of the seal. A scroll with the
word "seal" written in it has been held sufficient. Hunt vs. Miller,
1oI Wis., 583.
Ninth: The absence of one or both of the witnesses required
by the statute will invalidate the deed, and prevent the statute
from running in its favor. Whittlesey vs. Hoppenyan, 72 Wis.,
140.
Tenth: A defective acknowledgment would, of course, render
a deed void. The Court has held that the ordinary form of
acknowledgment is sufficient. Laughlin vs. Kieper, i-5 Wis.,
161.
This concludes a somewhat hasty and imperfect review of
some of the more common errors and defects which can render a
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tax deed invalid even after it has been recorded three years.
These points may be of some assistance in passing upon the
validity or invalidity of a tax deed. No attempt has been made
to exhaust the subject of tax titles; this discussion has been
limited to only one phase of it. Every man, and especially every
lawyer, is presumed to know the law; but in the matter of the
very complex law of tax titles the presumption is a violent one.
It may be of interest to know that the number of what might be
called "tax cases," down to and including Volume 133 of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court Reports is 1136. It is to the credit of
our Supreme Court, that through all this maze of litigation they
have constantly kept in view certain definite, fixed principles and
as a result the law of tax titles, in this State, has crystallized into
clear, coherent, definite form.
The writer has had occasion during the past ten years to visit
most of the other States of the Union for the express purpose of
studying their system of taxation, and it seems that the State of
Wisconsin has today a more definite, clearly defined and rational
system of taxation than can be found in any other State; and it
may safely be added that in no other State have the proper theory
and functions of the tax title been more fully developed and
applied. It is doubtful whether in any other state so many good
tax titles can be found. In 1896 our Supreme Court, after some
hesitation held that a tax title fair upon its face was prima facie
a marketable title, which the vendee was bound to accept as such
unless objection was made and it was found upon a hearing to
be not free from reasonable doubt. Gates vs. Parmley, 93 Wis.,
312.
A Wisconsin tax deed may be, and often is, as strong a title
as a patent direct from the government. Millions of dollars worth
of valuable property are now securely held by such titles in this
State.
The subject of tax titles is, therefore, a very important one
to Wisconsin lawyers, and is deserving of close study and atten-
tion.
